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of historical construction is not that the former failed to form general theories; it seems that all of them, from Herodotus down, did that; and were just as concerned as is our author in applying them to the relief of man's estate. The difference seems to lie in their acute sense that an hypothesis needs verification, in the way open to an historian, by showing how the factors they have discovered interact with accepted factors in human action to produce a series of events; these factors must explain not only the resemblance between the several events but also the differences between them, and all the characteristics peculiar to what remains of the past, in monument, tradition, record or institution. How can this be done save in a detailed narration?

On what ground is it asserted that the migration of groups is uniformly or even commonly caused by changes in climate? We are told (p. 76), that "we can not assume in groups long fixed in habitat and ideas any sudden desire for booty or freedom or glory or for 'something unattainable.'" Neither may we assume the absence of these motives. It happens that in the case of those migrations we know best these are the motives to which the evidence seems to point. No psychologist, least of all James, will rule them out as possible or even as probable factors, even as fundamental causes operating through the medium of some Mohammad, Attila, Cortez or Endicott. Why assume a destructive change of climate in cases where the evidence only points to the possibility and not to the actuality of such a change? It seems that the need for finding a "factor operative in all human experience" has misled the writer. It is perhaps true that the *vera causa* of any event is a factor universally present; but when applied to man this universal factor in a migratory movement would prove to be the neural stimulus to certain essential muscles of the body. *Universal* principles still have very limited utility in the field of history.

While the argument is highly ingenious and stimulating to "critical activity" of a certain kind, I must say that I do not find any of its conclusions adequately supported.

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The Next Step in Religion: An Essay toward the Coming Renaissance. ROY WOOD SELLARS. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1918. Pp. vii + 228.

"I challenge any one to develop a really tenable system of theology, a system which is self-consistent and relevant to the world as we know it. I am certain that it can not be done." These words of Professor Sellars (p. 164) characterize his book rather better than

its title. For not only does he give little exposition of the renaissance that is said to be coming, and not only is he himself in doubt whether the next step should be described as a step "in religion" (pp. 121, 220 ff.) or—as some readers will say—a step *out* of religion, but the general plan of the book is that of a refutation of all possible theologies. The method consists, in general, in showing, *first*, that theological doctrines originated in mythological and magical notions; *second*, that the influence of these notions is present even in current theology, and *third*, that the necessity of surrendering them in favor of scientific views of the world and of man will involve a complete renunciation of faith in God and a future life. In the end, so the author is convinced, men will settle down to contented enjoyment of the values that are certainly within our grasp (p. 121).

If the book were addressed to philosophers its theme could be described as a thesis concerning the respective relations of facts and values to reality. But the author can not have in mind an audience of philosophical critics, else he would not offer a great number of conclusions from a vast range of research—anthropology, psychology, ethics, the logic of evolution—without analysis of the critical studies that now occupy the attention of original investigators. This remark applies even to what he regards as the crucial point for his theory, namely, the nature of mind, and its place in evolution. He merely asserts that "experimental sappers in the laboratories of biology and psychology . . . are seeking to show that . . . mind is just a term for certain capacities of control exercised by the brain" (p. 99), and affirms his own conviction that the mind-body problem is about to be solved (pp. 99, 149, 217). Thus, without as much as a reference to the upspringing of dynamic and functional psychology, or to any view of evolution other than that of "a closed system of causal relations which spring from the nature of its parts" (pp. 117 ff.), he presents his particular point of view as *the* scientific one. That is, his book is neither philosophy nor science, but preaching. As preaching it might have dispensed with its one exact citation of sources (p. 7), just as it may be excused for such hasty expressions as that "science arose at the time of the Renaissance" (p. 63) and that insanity is due to "a functional disorder" of the brain (p. 146), as well as for the prominence of the personal equation (pp. 99, 149, 164, 217).

Inasmuch, however, as this preaching takes certain positive philosophical positions, the reader will not be unduly critical if he asks whether at one vital point the author has not entangled himself in his own reasoning. He argues for a strictly impersonal view of nature, and he affirms that from this objective standpoint "evil and good differ not a jot from each other" (p. 166); he includes man

wholly and unreservedly within nature, as we have seen; yet he regards man's "will to live and create" as "the source of all value," and he regards nature as "a thing to be used for his own desired ends" (p. 166). If nature includes man, and man creates and values, then the universe is not a closed system that springs from the nature of its parts, nor is evolution utterly indifferent to good and evil.

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JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. Sept.-Oct., 1918. *Études sur la signification et la place de la Physique dans la Philosophie de Platon* (premier article, pp. 177-220): L. ROBIN. - The physics of Plato, while teleological, is also in a sense mechanistic; the purpose of the study is to determine precisely the signification and place of the mechanistic conception. *Descartes expérimentateur* (pp. 221-240): G. MILHAUD. - Descartes was disposed, "to a degree that one does not suspect, to follow instinctively the objective and spontaneous march of the science of his *milieu* and his time." *La Mémoire* (pp. 241-281). - A succinct exposition of the actual state of knowledge on the question of memory. *L'avenir de la Religion et le Mysticisme moral d'après M. Loisy* (pp. 282-308): G. BELOT. - "The capital problem appears . . . to result from the conflict between the apology given for 'Religion' and the radical critique that is made of 'Religions.' The first is stated to be necessary; but the existing religions are declared profoundly insufficient." The idea of the mystic character of morals, advanced by Loisy, and regarded as the essence of religion, is critically examined. *Notes et Documents. La valeur des conclusions par l'absurde*: M. DOROLLE. *Revue Critique*. William Mackintire Salter; *Nietzsche the Thinker*: ANDRÉ FAUCONNET. *Analyses et Comptes rendus*. Victor Delbos, *Figures et doctrines de Philosophes*: J. SÉGOND. L. Dugas, *La mémoire et l'oubli*: FR. PAULHAN. Marthe Borély, *Le génie féminin français*: FR. PAULHAN. *Revue des Périodiques*.

Howard, Delton Thomas. John Dewey's Logical Theory. New York: Longmans, Green & Co. 1918. Pp. iv + 135.

Wylie, Harry H. An Experimental Study of Transfer of Response in the White Rat. Behavior Monograph No. 16. New York: Henry Holt & Co. 1919. Pp. 65. \$1.00.